Australian Media Reform - Discerning the Policy by Hitchens, LP
246 UNSW Law Journal Volume 30(1) 
AUSTRALIAN MEDIA REFORM- DISCERNING THE POLICY 
LESLEY HITCHENS* 
I INTRODUCTION 
When the Federal Government's media reform package passed through 
Parliament in October 2006, it was the realisation of a long-anticipated 
aspiration. While the Government had wanted to reform media ownership and 
control regulation since the '90s, it was not until its return to power in both 
Houses of Parliament in 2004, that it was finally able to achieve this reform. 
Initially, the Govemment had only been interested in tackling media ownership, 
but the final reform package was broader than this, including also digital media, 
the regulatory powers of the communications regulator, the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority ('ACMA'), and indirectly, the anti-
siphoning regime. which protects certain events for free-to-air television access. 1 
In pa11, this broader reform package was made necessa1y because the 
Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) ('BSA') included provisions which would, 
on certain dates, automatically trigger changes to the media framework. These 
looming deadlines required the Government to consider whether the changes 
which would occur were consistent with current media policy. The BSA also ·· 
provided for an analogue switch off date to commence in 2008, but it was clear 
that this date was unrealistic and a new timetable would be needed.2 
The broader reform package can also be attributed to the awareness of Senator 
Coonan, Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the A1ts, 
that if there was to be genuine scope for new entrants and services to the media 
sector, reform had to embody more than just media ownership reform.3 Senator 
Coonan's understanding echoed the conclusions of the Productivity 
Commission's investigation into broadcasting, completed in 2000.4 The 
Commission's report had been critical of the way in which government policy 
and regulation had aitificially constrained the potential for competition and 
* Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales. 
I This article is mainly concerned with the media ownership and digital reforms. 
2 The switch ofT date was determined by the period for simulcasting of analogue and digital: Broadcasting 
Saviccs Act/992 (Cth) ('BSA'), sch 4, cl6(3)(c). 
3 Senator Helen Coonan, 'The New Multimedia World', (Speech delivered at the National Press Club, 
Canberra, 31 August 2005 ): 
<http://www .minister.dcita.gov.au/mcdia/spccches/the _new _multimedia_ world_-
_addrcss_to_lhc_national_press_club_-_canberra_-_31_august_2005> at 2X June 2007 ( '2005 Speech'). 
4 Productivity Commission, Broadmsting, Report No I I (2000). 
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diversity in the broadcasting market. It referred particularly to the policies of 
digital broadcasting, anti-siphoning, and pay television as examples of artificial 
constraints. The report was also critical of the way in which the long-standing 
preference for protection of the free-to-air broadcasting services had skewed 
media policy. Whilst the Productivity Commission concluded that there was 
scope for media ownership reform, it did not consider that such reform, 
particularly cross--media, was appropriate until there were also structural changes 
which would tackle some of these artificial constraints.5 Senator Coonan's 2005 
Speech was essentially the first acknowledgement by the Government of the 
Commission's view.6 The media reforms were therefore significant, in that they 
attempted to deal with these structural limitations by including changes to the 
digital and anti-siphoning regimes in the reform package. 
Australia has not been alone in wanting to pursue media reform, particularly of 
media ownership regulation. The United Kingdom and the United States have 
also sought to implement change. In the case of the UK, substantial reform of 
media ownership laws was implemented along with a major redesign of 
communications regulation. These changes were introduced by the 
Communications Act 2003 (UK). In the US, the Federal Communications 
Commission ('FCC'), the communications regulatory authority, introduced new 
rules in June 2003. However, these rules, which constituted a major relaxation of 
the existing rules, were successfully challenged by various public interest groups, 
and the rules were stayed.7 In July 2006, the FCC initiated a new rule making 
process, and at the time of writing this remains ongoing.8 As noted in the next 
section, both of these jurisdictions engaged in lengthy policy debates about the 
reform proposals. 
The 2006 Australian reform process seemed initially to promise a similar 
deliberative process, however the later rush through Parliament, with only two 
days allowed for Senate Committee hearings (which included testimony from 
over 30 witnesses) appeared to disavow the earlier signs. Policy soul searching 
does not seem to come naturally to Australian law-makers.9 However, policy 
articulation and deliberation has an important role to play in ensuring a more 
transparent and comprehensive law-making process. Explaining and developing 
the policy arguments allows assessment of whether the rationales for reform are 
sustainable. Articulation of policy also enables a better judgement of how well 
the policy has translated into law, and, at a later stage, to evaluate its impact. The 
risk of brief or off hand policy references is that they speak only to the initiated-
which in the media policy context usually means industry. Yet, the wider public 
5 Ibid 364-66. 
6 See Coonan, above n 3. 
7 Prometheus Radio Projectv Federal Communications Commission 373 F 3d 372 (3'd Cir, 2004). 
8 FCC. Notice of Proposed Rule t'vlaking. 17 FCC Red 18503 (28 October 2002) 
<http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC -06-93A l.pdt> at 30 June 2007. 
9 I have argued elsewhere that the history of media policy making in Australia, particularly in relation to 
media ownership locks articulation: see Lesley Hitchens. Broadcasting Pluralism al/£1 Diversi(v: A 
Comparative Stlll(V ofPolic:l' and Regulation (2006) 122-24 and generally. This is a comment that seems 
to be applicable in other areas: see Andrew Lynch and George Williams, What Price Securi(v? (2006) 68-
69. 
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has an important stake in how media policy is informed. The media is crucial to 
the public's patiicipation in and understanding of its community. Policy 
atiiculation should offer a greater oppmiunity for the public to be involved in the 
policy choices which are implemented. This miicle will examine the scope and 
validity of policy claims for the 2006 media reforms. 
II THE PATH TO REFORM 
The Govemment made two attempts during 2002-2003 to reform media 
ownership, intending to remove foreign ownership rules and relax cross-media, 
but its failure to control the Senate hindered these efforts. 10 Apati from the odd 
ministerial reference, no policy process had preceded the introduction of these 
bills, and, indeed, the first bill could be seen as something of a green paper, 
designed to test the likely areas of opposition. However when the Government 
was retumed to power in 2004, media reform was anticipated. The first 
significant indication of the Govemment's thinking came with Senator Coonan's 
2005 Speech. 11 This was followed by a discussion paper in March 2006 on 
options for media refonn, 12 and, in July, a statement announcing the 
Govemment's legislative plans. 13 The legislation was passed in October, with 
only limited time for debate. Although the Discussion Paper had appeared to 
offer a more open policy-making process, it too was constrained by a period of 
only five weeks for submissions. Apart from the July announcement, there was 
no follow-up paper by the Government responding to the submissions. 
This approach can be contrasted with the reform processes in the UK and in 
the US. Although both these processes had weaknesses, they nevetiheless 
provide evidence of a policy and law-making process which ensured that 
oppotiunities for timely input and debate were available. 14 In 2000, well before 
the final legislation, the UK Govemment published a white paper, A New Future 
for Communications. 15 The Govemment released several other documents during 
the process, designed to flesh out further detail of aspects of its proposals or to 
enable further consultation, and, in 2002, a draft Communications Bill. 16 In 
addition to parliamentary debates in the course of the legislative process, 
parliamentary committees also considered and reported on the reform proposals. 
The most influential of these committees was a joint House of Lords and House 
of Commons committee, chaired by Lord Puttnam. Many of the 
recommendations of the Puttnam Committee were accepted by the UK 
I 0 Broadcasting Services Amendment (Media Ownership) Bill 2002 (Cth) and Broadcasting Services 
Amendment (Media Ownership) Bill 2002 (No 2) (Clh). 
II Coonan, above n 3. 
12 Australian Government, Meeting the Digital Age. Reforming Australia's Media in the Digital Age, 
Discussion Paper on Media Reforms (2006) ('Discussion Paper'). 
13 Senator Helen Coonan, 'New Media Framework for Australia', (Press Release, 13 July 2006). 
14 A more detailed consideration, and critique, of these processes can be found in Hitchens, above n 9, 26!;-
93. 
15 Department lor Culture Media and Sport ('DCMS') and Department of Trade and Industry ('DTI'), A 
New Future for Communications, Cmnd 50 I 0 (2000) [ 1.2.1 ]-[ 1.2.12]. 
I(\ Drali Communications Bill (2002) (UK). 
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Government, either wholly or in part, and incorporated into the legislation which 
passed in 2003. 17 
The US process operated somewhat differently, but consistent with the FCC's 
extensive rule-making powers. A regular review was required under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. 18 The review which led to the 2003 rule 
announcement was launched in September 2002. 19 Following the initial notice of 
the review, the FCC received extensive submissions and undertook flll1her 
studies of its own initiative. It also received communications from about two 
million members of the general public by email, letters, and petitions expressing 
opposition to the proposed changes. 20 In June 2003, it released a lengthy report, 
which set out its reasoning and announced extensive changes to almost all of the 
media ownership rules then in place. 21 As noted earlier, the ruling was subject to 
a legal challenge, as a result of which the new rules were stayed, and a new rule-
making process instituted. 
Australian law-making processes do not seem eager to incorporate extended 
deliberative policy processes similar to those in the UK and US. The BSA 
incorporates a set of explicit policy objectives (s 3), and all reforms could be seen 
to develop from these objectives. Yet even if these objectives act as the policy 
backdrop to the reforms, this does not necessarily ensure that the policy is 
explicit: the realisation of some of the statutory objectives will necessarily 
involve trade-offs with others. In fact, in the various reform documents, there is 
almost no mention of these statutory objectives: the Discussion Paper makes one 
reference,22 and a few references can be found in explanatory memoranda 
accompanying the media ownership and digital bills. In the absence of extended 
policy discussions one is left with brief indications only. The key to identifying 
the policy basis for reform is the 2005 Speech and the Discussion Paper. In 
reviewing the documents, it is apparent that the main policy concerns driving the 
reform were the provision of diversity, and the provision of an open and 
competitive market.23 Diversity is described as relating to diversity of services 
and ownership.24 The provision of an open and competitive market is identified 
as recognition that, in a 'converged environment', the traditional regulatory 
controls on market structures need to give way to a regulatory framework which 
'allows some efficiencies of scale and scope while encouraging new players, new 
investment and new services' .zs 
The Discussion Paper was the major source of information about the 










Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Bill, House of Commons and House of Lords, Report and 
Minutes of Evidence with Appendices, Draji Communications Bill (2002) HL 169-1 and HC 876-1. 
Pub L No 104-104, II 0 Stat 56 ( 1996). . 
See FCC, above n 8. 
Prometheus Radio Project v Federal Communications Commission 373 F 3d 372 (3'd Cir, 2004). 
FCC, Report and Order wul Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 03-127 (2 June 2003). 
There is a reference to s 3(b) (provision of a regulatory environment which will facilitate the development 
of the broadcasting indust1y): Discussion Paper, above n 12, 38. 
Coonan, above n 3, 3. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
250 UNSW Law Journal Volume 30(1) 
public consultation process. However, there is very little explicit discussion or 
elaboration of the policy basis for reform, or the evidence justifying the policy.26 
Generally, there is little more than a repetition of the ideas expressed in the 2005 
Speech. What the Discussion Paper does do is link the reform proposals to the 
policy settings. For example, encouraging and expediting the conversion from 
analogue services to digital is seen as valuable both to industry and the public 
because it would provide opportunities (through the availability of additional 
spectrum) for the provision of new services.27 Similarly, proposals to exploit the 
spectrum set aside for datacasting services favoured new digital setvices instead 
of allocating the spectrum for a fourth commercial free-to-air television setvice. 
These proposals are justified on the basis that they will 'contribute to diversity 
and provide extra content and setvices for viewers'. 28 By proposing relaxation, 
and not removal, of the cross-media rules, media services most widely used by, 
and accessible to, the general public will be protected.29 With media ownership 
reform there is more emphasis on the policy goal of creating an open and 
competitive market. The Discussion Paper cites the cross-media laws as stifling 
the development of new setvices and investment, and constraining media 
companies in the changing media environment.30 In contrast, reforms to cross-
media rules and to foreign ownership are envisaged as enabling new services and 
players to emerge. 31 There is a link between the two policies because there are 
two senses in which the Discussion Paper refers to 'diversity'. First, the reform 
proposals aim to protect diversity, and, secondly, diversity is promoted by the 
policy goal of providing an open and competitive market. 
HI ANALYSING THE POLICY RATIONALES 
The central policy focus, and justification for the media reforms, as outlined 
above, was encapsulated by the Minister during her second reading speech: 
The current set of media laws are based on a 20'11 century model of radio, free-to-air 
television and daily newspapers. Even in the late 1980s, it was clear the media 
landscape was accelerating towards the explosive changes that we have witnessed 
in the last decade .... Amending the ownership rules will let the media market 
operate more efficiently, benefiting industry and consumers alike by permitting 
greater competition and economies of scale and scope and investment in the 
services consumers expect and want. ... In combination with [the digital reforms] 
... the bill will open up oppOiiunities for a range of new innovative new services 
for consumers while maintaining the existing services that the community already 
relies on and enjoys, including quality free-to-air television services. The proposed 
reforms will enable existing players to make the most of emerging digital 
technologies and give them the flexibility to structure their businesses to be 
globally competitive media companies and to continue to deliver quality services to 
their audiences.32 
26 See Discussion Paper, above n 12, 3-4. 
27 Ibid 16. 
28 Ibid 21. 
29 Ibid 40. 
30 Ibid 38. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Commonwealth, ParliamenlmJ' Debates, Senate, II October 2006, 115-16 (Senator Helen Coonan). 
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Anyone familiar with the media reform process in the US and the UK will be 
familiar too with this line of ar:5ument. In both jurisdictions, similar claims were 
used to justify radical change. Thus, a common argument is that relaxing the 
restrictions on media industry will allow them to expand and compete more 
effectively, and this, in turn, will help to promote diversity and bring new 
entrants to the market. In this way diversity is simultaneously promoted and 
protected because some sector-specific ownership mles will, at least in the 
immediate and medium term, remain. The appropriateness of liberalisation is 
repeatedly justified by the new media developments. The public is no longer 
restricted to a small set of media services, but has access to an abundance of 
offerings. Yet, despite the confidence, and apparent certainty, with which each of 
the three jurisdictions state these arguments, it is not apparent they stand up to 
closer scrutiny. In the following sections, these policy arguments and 
justifications will be considered. 
IV NEW MEDIA ABUNDANCE 
The changing media landscape has been one of the key arguments justifying 
the appropriateness of reform, and it is described in some detail in the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Broadcasting Services Amendment (Media 
Ownership) Bill 2006 (Cth).34 In a recent speech given by Senator Coonan, this 
theme is again reflected when she refers to the newer means for 'delivering news 
and information to consumers' such as the internet, pay television, and mobile 
devices.35 She also refers to the growth in 'online offerings' mentioning 'blogs, 
websites, podcasts and chatrooms'. 36 There is no doubt that the media 
environment has changed and is changing, and this impact may be particularly 
experienced in Australia as the digital media reforms are realised. It is true also 
that the public is no longer constrained by the set menu of traditionally delivered 
media, but has a wider choice both with regard to the content itself, and the 
means of accessing that content. Additionally, such content is now experienced 
differently. For example, there is no longer the same dependence upon a 
broadcasting schedule. Content and programs can be 'pulled' from the internet, 
for example, when it is convenient. Even newspapers are experienced differently 
when accessed online. Instead of working from the front to the back of the 
newspaper, accessing the content according to the editor's 'schedule', the online 
reader sets his or her own 'schedule', selecting items at random or according to 
the reader's interests. Even for those who still access visual content via the 
33 See, eg, Tessa Jowell And Patricia Hewitt, 'Consultation on Media Ownership Rules' (Consultation 
Paper, DCMS and DTI, 2001) [1.2]; FCC, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, above 
n 21, [4]-[5], [367]. 
34 Explanatory Memorandum, Broadcasting Services Amendment (Media Ownership) Bill 2006 (Cth) [ 17]-
[21]. 
35 Senator Helen Coonan, '2007- Reaping the Benefits of the Media Refom1s' (Speech delivered at ABN 
AMRO Communications Conference 2007, Sydney, 17 April 2007) 3 
<http://www.minister.dcita.gov.au/media/speeches/address_to_abn_amro_communications_conference_2 
007> at 28 June 2007. 
36 Ibid. 
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traditional access point of television, the proliferation of more sophisticated 
recording devices, such as personal video recorders, offers greater flexibility in 
the way in which programs are selected and received. Nor does it remain 
necessmy to take delivery of an entire newspaper or to sit through an entire 
program. Instead, the intemet and iPods, as well as personal video recorders, 
make it much easier to access content discretely. The Minister noted that internet 
content pa1ticularly, has generated a range of content which is outside the 
traditional professional production processes. The prevalence of various new 
delivery platforms: podcasting, content for mobile phones, and internet 
originated content are ce1tainly diversifying both the amount of content which is 
available, and the way in which this content is being produced. 
This changing technological environment has provided the reform process 
with a basis for rationalising more liberalised regulation. However, there has 
been scant investigation into the impact of the new media abundance. As pa11 of 
its rule-making process, the FCC developed an index, which included the intemet 
and the traditional media, to measure the degree of diversity in local media 
markets. However, the index was flawed in its design and criticised by the court 
reviewing the resulting rules.37 Accurate analysis of the impact of this new media 
environment is clearly important if it is to be used as a justification for reform. 
Whilst the intemet is now a well-established content source, it is still relatively 
early days for the development and uptake of mainstream rivals, such as IPTV 
and mobile content, and so it is difficult to envisage precisely what the media 
environment might be like in the medium to long tenn. Nevertheless, it is clear 
there is change, with even traditional free-to-air broadcasting media affected as 
digital technology and relaxed regulation increases the capacity for additional 
program and other services. 
Australia cited the internet as a source of content and contributor to diversity 
which could justify a more relaxed regulatory regime. This attribution requires 
closer examination. First, there is the issue of the extent to which this content is 
actually new material. One of the criticisms of the FCC's diversity index was its 
failure to take into account the extensive duplication of content, whereby the 
Internet is simply another means of accessing content already available on other 
platforms. Podcasting is similar, with mainstream broadcasters seeking to expand 
their audience reach by providing podcasts of content already delivered over the 
air. Duplication of content is likely to be an ongoing attribute of the intemet, if 
the experience of the US remains relevant: as at 2003, the top 20 internet news 
sites were owned by the same corporate groups which controlled the 
broadcasting networks, cable networks, and major newspaper chains.38 Ce1tainly, 
the internet enables a much broader range of content to be accessed. Thus the 
reader is no longer confined to a limited range of local newspapers, but can 
access, for example, online newspapers from around the world much more easily 
than their paper counterpa1ts. In this sense, there is an increased diversity of 
37 Prometheus Radio Project v Federal Communications Commission373 F 3d 372 (3'd Cir, 2004) 403 and 
405-09. 
38 Neil Hickey, "Power Shili' (2003) (March-April) Columbia Journalism Review 26-31. 
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content, although the ability to access a variety of sources of information and 
opinion on local matters may be of greater significance and value to the public -
something recognised by the local content mles required for regional media. 
It is true, as the Minister noted, that the internet, and to a developing extent 
podcasting, has generated new content. This can range from the amateur blogs 
and websites, to the professional forums or virtual magazines, such as Matilda 
and Crikey generated in Australia, Open Democracy (UK), and Salon.com (US). 
Whilst many of these have become impotiant media sources, in most cases the 
blogs and amateur podcasts, will remain niche sites, lacking professional 
resources, editorial control processes, and news gathering facilities. 39 The 
Minister expresses confidence about the richness of such sources of content,40 but 
at this stage it is difficult to assess the extent to which these new sources of 
content are viable and comparable competitors to the established content 
providers. Indeed it is intriguing, given the rapid expansion and ubiquity of the 
internet, how few professional independent news and information sites actually 
exist. This might suggest that entry costs act as a barrier for new platforms, just 
as much as they do for the traditional media. Although production and 
distribution of an online site may be relatively inexpensive, generation and 
production of news and current affairs content is likely to be comparable in cost 
to other media. Mainstream content providers will have an important advantage, 
because they will be able to exploit the extensive content resources already 
available to them. 
This brief review of 'new media modes' is a reminder of the need to exercise 
caution when speaking of the changing media environment. First, it is important 
not to confuse diversity of access or delivery with diversity of content. Secondly, 
it is necessary to look closely at the extent to which the content being delivered 
over these new delivery platforms represents new content, or merely the 
repackaging of content available elsewhere. Of course, it might be argued that a 
variety of delivery platforms available will open up opportunities for new 
entrants keen to access platfonns for content delivery. But again, caution is 
needed as media and communications companies have shown a voracious 
appetite in the past for seeking control over as many components of the content 
and distribution chain as possible. 
V THE INDUSTRY EXPANSION ARGUMENT 
Particularly relevant to the cross-media reforms was the argument that 
relaxation of the rules would enable industry to realise efficiencies of scale and 
scope, and to compete more effectively in the new media environment. This was 
envisaged as benefiting the public because it would enable increased investment 
in and provision of new services. This argument was used also in the UK and US. 
Indeed, it has been an ongoing rationale for media ownership rule relaxation in 
39 Trevor Cook et al, 'Regulation of news and cu1Tent affairs in a distributed media environment' (2005-
2006) 4 ACMA Sphere 16. See also Graeme Turner, Ending the A.ffair: the decline of television current 
affairs in Australia (2005) 137 and Terry Flew, New Media: An introduction (2002) 99. 
40 Coonan, above n 35. 
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the US: it has repeatedly been asse1ted that realised efficiencies would result in 
increa~ed pro~ram . spending.41 Relaxing o~nership rules generally results in 
consolidatiOn. - Tins has been the pattern m the US, and when there was a 
pmticularly significant relaxation of the rules in 1996, the result was a massive 
increase in consolidation. After the 1996 refonns Clear Channel Communications 
Inc held the larfest number of stations - 1200 - having controlled only 36 prior 
to the refonns.4 The UK media reforms included a significant relaxation of radio 
ownership rules. Since then there has been substantial industry consolidation, as 
well as a move by the television industry into radio.44 It is not readily apparent 
why consolidation should be expected to translate into increased expenditure and 
improved programming. Consolidation may well allow greater efficiencies to be 
realised, but there is no reason to expect that this will lead to something more 
than a return to investors. Indeed, consolidation may have a counter-productive 
impact by increasing the incentives and opportunities for repackaging of content 
across different media platfonns and delivering automated and remote 
programming across outlets operating within the same platfonn type.45 Increased 
expenditure on content is only likely to result if this also produces a better return 
on the investment. 
VI DIVERSITY 
As noted earlier, one of the significant features of the 2006 refonns was that 
the Government did not address media ownership refonn in isolation (as would 
have occuned with the 2002 refonn attempts), but instead chose to deal also with 
the broader media environment. The digital refonns were important. First, 
because they sought to undo some of the constraints built into the digital 
television structure when it was first introduced in 2001, such as the limits on 
multichannelling and prescription of high definition TV ('HDTV') transmission 
quotas. These constraints were heavily criticised by the Productivity Commission 
and seemed to limit the scope for the diversity which digital technology 
offered.46 The result was a slow uptake of digital television, although there are 
41 Hitchens, above n 9, 107-18 and 286-87. 
42 There are particular features of the media industry and content production which tend the industry 
towards consolidation. For an examination of this, see Gillian Doyle, Understanding Media Economics 
(2002) and Glenn Withers, 'Broadcasting' in Ruth Towse (ed), A Handbook ofCullllral Economics 
(2003) I 02. 
43 Gregory Prindle, 'No Competition: How Radio Consolidation has Diminished Diversity and Sacrificed 
Localism' (2003) 14 Fordham Intellectual Propel'ly, Media and Entertainment Law Jouma1279, 306. 
44 Sec Office of Communications ('Ofcorn'), Communications Market 2004 (2004) 13; Ofcom, 
Communications Market 2005 (2005) 35; Olcom, Communications Market 2006 (2006) 59, 62-3. 
45 This has been identified as a significant problem in the US, see Future of Music Coalition, Executive 
Summary, Radio Deregulation: Has it served its citizens and Musicians? (2002) Executive Summary 
<http://www.futureolinusic.com/images//FMCradioexccsum.pdf> at 28 June 2007. Media Watch has also 
identified examples of insensitive local programming: Regional Media Watch, 2007, ABC Television 
<http://www .abc.net.au/mediawatch/regional/> at 28 June 2007. 
46 Productivity Commission, above n 4, 244-59. 
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now signs of improvement.47 Secondly, the reform proposal of two new digital 
channels, Digital Channel A and Digital Channel B, provided an opp01tunity for 
new services in place of the unsuccessful datacasting services. These reforms in 
combination with media ownership reform were seen as promoting diversity of 
services and content. The opening up of the market to competition and the 
opportunities provided by the new media and technology were regarded as 
promoting diversity. In the Australian regulatory context, diversity as a policy 
objective has two distinct limbs as demonstrated in the BSA: diversity of services 
(s 3(a)) and diversity of control (s 3(c)). Whilst the latter is a reference to 
diversity of ownership, the former refers to diversity obtained through the 
provision of different types of broadcasting services such as national, 
commercial, and community services. Being structured and financed in different 
ways, and having different programme mandates, a diversity of services and 
content is possible. Whilst the comprehensive media reform is to be welcomed, 
there are various aspects of the package which seem to weaken the diversity 
sought by the reforms. 
The introduction of digital television into Australia was hampered by a 
number of arguably unnecessary restrictions. One of the priorities of the media 
reforms is the implementation of a digital action plan to drive digital take-up and 
to manage the transition from analogue to digital; the (somewhat optimistic) 
intention now being that the analogue signal will be switched off in the period 
commencing 2010-2012. The Government has recognised that a key driver for 
digital take-up is an increased choice of content,48 so it is curious that the reforms 
to the digital framework have been somewhat cautious.49 For example, although 
the genre restrictions which limited what could be shown on multichannels 
operated by the national broadcasting services, the ABC and the SBS, have now 
been lifted, the restrictions on commercial broadcasting services multichannelling 
will not be relaxed until 2009, and will not be removed until after analogue 
switch off. Bearing in mind that the new date for switch off is relatively near, this 
policy seems to limit one of the opportunities (increasing the range of content 
over free-to-air) for encouraging consumer take-up. The HDTV simulcast 
requirement has now been removed, which will allow broadcasters to offer a 
HDTV multichannel. However, this may have limited utility in encouraging 
digital take-up because HDTV reception requires much more expensive 
equipment. 
Similarly, the design for the new digital channels appears to constrain the 
scope for diversity. Digital Channel A will be a free-to-air service which can be 
offered for reception on a standard digital in home television receiver, but it is 
limited by the type of content service it can offer to narrowcasting, datacasting or 
4 7 ACMA, 'ACMA report finds take-up of digital free-to-air television has more than doubled since 2005' 
(Press Release, 30 May 2007) <http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD//pc=PC_31 0265> at 28 June 
2007. 
48 Coonan, above n 3, 8. 
49 For a discussion of how Australian content requirements might be intluencing these decisions, see Jason 
Bosland, 'Regulating for Local Content in the Digital Audiovisual Environment- A View from 
Australia' (2007) 18(3) Entertainment Law Review I 03. 
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community broadcasting. This means that it will be limited to niche 
programming, and will not be able to offer the type of content which might be 
attractive to a broader audience as well as being commercially more attractive to 
the industry. This is presumably so as not to undermine the position of the 
current free-to-air commercial broadcasting services which will have greater 
regulatory obligations, but in combination with the other limitations in the digital 
framework, it seems again to limit the potential offered by digital. Digital 
Channel B has greater flexibility depending upon how it is received. If it is to be 
received on a domestic digital receiver it cannot provide a commercial or 
subscription service, but if the channel is provided for reception by some other 
means, such as a mobile device, then there is flexibility in the type of services 
which can be offered. Senator Coonan has already begun to refer to the type of 
content which might be distributed on a Digital Channel B service as 'snack 
television' - a revealing clue perhaps to the true diversity offered by this new 
media abundance. 50 Diversity of control is also in issue in relation to the 
allocation of these new digital channels. Commercial television broadcasting 
licensees and the national broadcasters will not be able to control a Channel A 
licence. However, aside from general competition law, there are no control 
restrictions on a Channel B licence, provided it is not used for in-home services. 
The design of the digital channels has been subject to some media industry 
criticism. For example, Fairfax Media have argued that the content restrictions on 
Channel A make it commercially unviable, and the lack of control restrictions on 
Channel B will limit the scope for diversity, because commercial television 
licensees would be likely to bid for Channel B and will simply repackage 
material.51 The Media, Entertainment and Atis Alliance doubted whether there 
was any industry confidence that the new digital channel model would work. 52 
The legislation does provide for an access regime for Channel B, but it will 
remain to be seen whether this provides an oppmiunity for greater diversity of 
providers and content, or acts as a further disincentive to industty. 
VII CONCLUSION- THE MISSING CITIZEN 
The policy goals and justifications for the reform have weaknesses, and some 
aspects of the new laws appear to undermine the goals sought for the reform. 
Despite some early signs of a different approach, the 2006 media reforms were 
ultimately implemented with a process which minimised debate and deliberation. 
Media policy and regulation is always a sensitive matter, and Australian media 
policy has a rich history of such sensitivity. The sensitivities of the media sector 
50 Senator Helen Coonan, ·Australian Consumers to benefit following passing of Media Laws' (Media 
Release, 18 October 2006), 
<http://www .minister.deita.gov .au/media/media _releases/austral ian_ consumers_ to_ benefit_ following_pa 
ssage_of_media_laws> at 28 June 2007. 
51 Evidence to Standing Committee on Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the 
Arts, Parliament of Australia, Broadcasting Services Amendment (Media Ownership) Bill2006, 
Canberra, 28 September 2006, 2-4 (James Hooke, Managing Director, Fairfax). 
52 Ibid, 21-2 (Christopher Warren, Federal Secretary, Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance). 
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might certainly give rise to shortcomings in policy and policy process, but 
perhaps another reason can be suggested also, as revealed in the language of the 
policy. In the Discussion Paper and the speeches made by the Minister during the 
reform process, the public is only characterized as a 'consumer', never as 
'citizen'. In the 2005 Speech, the reference is only to 'consumers'. The 
Discussion Paper makes forty-two references to 'consumer' or 'consumers', 
whilst the only reference to 'citizen' was a reference to French citizens. 
Similarly, in Senator Coonan's announcement of the reforms in July 2006, there 
are ten references to 'consumer/s', but none to 'citizen/s'. Indeed, it is interesting 
to observe that one of the few occasions a different label is used is when the 
Discussion Paper refers to protection of local content in regional areas: here, the 
reference is to 'regional Australians'. 53 During the UK reform process however 
there was a protracted debate about the need to recognize both citizen and 
consumer interests in the new regulatory framework. 
To focus on this distinction between consumer and citizen might be thought to 
be reading too much into the policy process. The public clearly has a consumer 
interest in the reforms. Digital policy directly affects the consumer decisions 
which must be made, for example, about what equipment to purchase. But, as 
members of the public, we function as both consumers and citizens. In our 
character as consumers, we can be said to engage as private individuals. To speak 
of the public's interest in media policy as only a consumer interest is to reduce 
the role of media to an individual and transactional one. However, as citizens, we 
have a collective interest in the role that the media plays in that wider 
community, the public realm; an interest that is more than just the sum of our 
individual interests as consumers.54 To ignore the interest the public has as 
'citizen' risks leaving leave media policy half formed. 
53 Discussion Paper, above n 12, 41. 
54 Shalini Venturelli, Liberalizing the European Media: Politics. Regulation. and the Public Sphere ( 1998) 
72. 
